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Abstract 
Stroke can lead to motor impairments that can affect the body structure and restraint 
mobility. We hypothesize that brain lesions and their motor sequelae can distort the 
body schema, a sensorimotor map of body parts and elements in the peripersonal space 
through which human beings embody the reachable space and ready the body for 
forthcoming movements. Two main constructs have been identified in the embodiment 
mechanism: body-ownership, the sense that the body that one inhabits is his/her own, 
and agency, the sense that one can move and control his/her body. To test this, the 
present study simultaneously investigated different embodiment subcomponents (body-
ownership, localization, and agency) and different neurophysiological measures 
(galvanic skin response, skin temperature, and surface electromyographic activity), and 
the interaction between them, in clinically-controlled hemiparetic individuals with 
stroke and in healthy subjects after the rubber hand illusion. Individuals with stroke 
reported significantly stronger body-ownership and agency and reduced increase of 
galvanic skin response, skin temperature, and muscular activity in the stimulated hand. 
We suggest that differences in embodiment could have been motivated by increased 
plasticity of the body schema and pathological predominance of the visual input over 
proprioception. We also suggest that differences in neurophysiological responses could 
have been promoted by a suppression of the reflex activity of the sympathetic nervous 
system and by the involvement of the premotor cortex in the reconfiguration of the body 
schema. These results could evidence a body schema plasticity promoted by the brain 
lesion and a main role of the premotor cortex in this mechanism. 
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Body schema, Body-ownership, Embodiment, Rubber hand illusion, Stroke, 
Neurophysiology 
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RHI: Rubber Hand Illusion; GSR: Galvanic Skin Response; sEMG: surface 
Electromyographic Activity 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
Embodiment is a multi-component psychological construct that has been explained as 
the sense of one’s own body (Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke, 2006), as the bodily 
self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006), or as corporeal awareness (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 
1997). Although different definitions have been proposed, embodiment could be 
understood as the representation of an element (bodily or not) within the body schema 
(de Vignemont, 2011). Recent research has focused on unifying aspects of the 
embodied cognition theories and on identifying its subcomponents, such as body-
ownership and agency (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, 
& Haggard, 2008). Body-ownership can be defined as the sense that the body that one 
inhabits is his/her own (Tsakiris, 2010). Agency refers to the sense that one can move 
and control his/her body (Tsakiris, 2010). Consequently, body-ownership should be 
continuous and omnipresent and, in contrast, only voluntary actions, fired by efferent 
signals, should elicit agency. Both constructs have been postulated as dissociated 
concepts (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010), but this is still 
a matter of debate (Ma & Hommel, 2015).  
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is an experiment that allows investigating 
body-ownership in the absence of movement (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This 
phenomenon involves cross-modal interaction of sight, touch, and proprioception to 
create a convincing feeling of body-ownership over an external body part (Lloyd, Gillis, 
Lewis, Farrell, & Morrison, 2013). Although this experiment has been widely replicated 
in neuroscience studies to determine the influence of sensory inputs on body 
representation (Ramakonar, Franz, & Lind, 2011), the neural signatures of this illusion 
still remain unclear. Preliminary research points to the right insula (Tsakiris, Hesse, 
Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2010), the posterior cingular cortex 
(Guterstam, Bjornsdotter, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2015), and the premotor cortex 
(Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2014; Gentile, Bjornsdotter, Petkova, Abdulkarim, & 
Ehrsson, 2015; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2015; Petkova et al., 2011; Zeller, Gross, 
Bartsch, Johansen-Berg, & Classen, 2011) as having a major role in the RHI. 
Additionally, many different studies have investigated the underlying 
neurophysiological correlates of the phenomenon under different conditions, mainly 
examining variations in the skin temperature (Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Kammers, Rose, 
& Haggard, 2011; Moseley, Olthof, et al., 2008; Rohde, Wold, Karnath, & Ernst, 2013; 
Salomon, Lim, Pfeiffer, Gassert, & Blanke, 2013; Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & Park, 
2011; van Stralen et al., 2014), and the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; D'Alonzo & Cipriani, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2008; Ma & Hommel, 
2013; Reinersmann et al., 2013), which represent autonomic nerve responses to the 
sweat gland function. However, these variables only reflect the function of the 
sympathetic nervous system. The influence of the RHI in other systems, and the 
interaction between these variables still remain unexplored.  
Different studies have also assessed the effect of the RHI in different 
populations (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Reinersmann et al., 2013; Thakkar et al., 2011; van 
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Stralen et al., 2014). The nature of stroke and its derived impairments could provide an 
interesting framework to study the embodiment constructs (de Vignemont, 2011). In 
fact, stroke has been posed to be a common cause of disorders of body schema (Corbett 
& Shah, 1996), a neural representation of the body parts relative to each other and 
objects in the environment from the integration of visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive 
inputs (Corbett & Shah, 1996; Haggard & Wolpert, 2005). Motor impairments such as 
hemiparesis, a consequence of injuries to the pyramidal tract above the medulla that 
shows up as muscle weakness during voluntary movements in 50% of stroke survivors 
six months after onset (Kelly-Hayes et al., 2003), could exacerbate the incidence of 
these disorders. However, literature about the effect of stroke on embodiment is scant 
and to date few empirical studies exist. A big study involving also healthy participants 
initially reported that individuals with stroke were less likely to feel the illusion (Zeller 
et al., 2011). In contrast, more recent RHI studies in a subject with hand disownership 
(van Stralen, van Zandvoort, Kappelle, & Dijkerman, 2013) and in pure hemiplegic 
subjects (Burin et al., 2015) showed stronger illusion on the affected hand than in the 
less affected hand, which could evidence an impaired sense of ownership or a tendency 
to gain ownership over external body parts in the hemiparetic side. More studies 
controlling the clinical variables that may affect the results and including 
neurophysiological recordings are needed to confirm this hypothesis and to elaborate a 
common rationale for the underlying neural processes that promote these effects. In 
addition, although a few attempts have been made to assess body-ownership after 
stroke, other sub-components of embodiment have been ignored. 
We hypothesize that the functional and neurophysiological alterations derived 
from stroke would promote alterations in the body schema that would facilitate an 
intensification of the embodiment sub-components during the RHI compared to healthy 
individuals. We conjecture, in light of the existing evidence that supports the 
involvement of the premotor cortex in the brain mechanisms of the illusion, that the 
experiment would elicit different neurophysiological responses in both groups, not only 
in the skin temperature and the GSR but also in the muscular activity. The aim of this 
study is therefore to investigate the subjective (body-ownership, localization, and 
agency) and neurophysiological responses (skin temperature, GSR, and 
electromyography) to the RHI, and the relationship between them, in healthy subjects 
and clinically-controlled individuals with stroke.  
Methods  
Participants  
Both hemiparetic individuals following a first time stroke and healthy subjects were 
recruited. Inclusion criteria in the stroke group were 1) age ≥ 50 and ≤ 80 years old; 2) 
chronicity > 6 months; 3) absence of severe cognitive impairment as defined by Mini-
Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) > 23; and 4) able to 
follow instructions as defined by the receptive language subscale of the Mississippi 
Aphasia Screening Test (Romero et al., 2012) ≥ 45. Individuals were excluded if they 
had 1) increase in muscle tone as defined by Modified Ashworth Scale (Bohannon & 
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Smith, 1987) > 3; 2) joint stiffness that prevented arm positioning according to the 
requirements of the study; 3) peripheral nerve damage affecting the upper extremities; 
4) orthopedic alterations or pain syndrome of the upper limbs; 5) visual or hearing 
impairment that did not allow possibility of interaction; 6) unilateral spatial neglect; and 
7) asomatognosia. Individuals with stroke were recruited from the total pool of 
outpatients who had suffered a stroke and were attending a long-term rehabilitation 
program in the Brain Injury Service of NISA Hospital Valencia al Mar (Valencia, 
Spain). Participants were included in the healthy group if they were 50 to 80 years old 
and had no motor or cognitive impairment. These participants were recruited using 
advertisements on social media and community outreach. 
Twenty individuals with stroke and 21 healthy individuals satisfied inclusion 
and exclusion criteria and accepted to participate in the study (Table 1). After inclusion 
in the study, motor impairment of the participants with stroke was assessed with the 
Motricity Index (Kopp et al., 1997), and their sensory impairment in the hand and wrist 
was assessed with the Nottingham Sensory Assessment (Lincoln, Jackson, & Adams, 
1998), a standardized tool for multi-modal sensory examination that evaluates tactile 
sensation (light touch, pressure, pinprick sensation, temperature discrimination, tactile 
localization, and bilateral simultaneous stimulation), kinesthesia, and stereognosis. 
Handedness of healthy participants was assessed using the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), as in previous studies (Ocklenburg, Ruther, Peterburs, 
Pinnow, & Gunturkun, 2011). 
Table 1. Characteristics of the participants 
 Post-stroke 
individuals 
(n=20) 
Healthy 
individuals 
(n=21) 
Significance 
Sex (n,%) 
   Male 
   Female 
 
15 (75 %) 
5 (25 %) 
 
13 (62 %) 
8 (38 %) 
p=0.017 
 
Age (years) 59.5±8.9 59.9±7.5 NS 
(p=0.845) 
Chronicity (days) 844.3±312.7 -  
Etiology (n, %) 
   Hemorrhagic 
   Ischemic 
      TACI 
      PACI 
 
9 (45 %) 
11 (55 %) 
4 
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- 
 
Laterality of the lesion (n, %) 
   Left 
   Right 
 
10 (50 %) 
10 (50 %) 
 
- 
 
Non-dominant/hemiparetic side (n, %) 
   Left 
   Right 
 
10 (50 %) 
10 (50 %) 
 
16 (76 %) 
5 ( 24 %) 
 
NS 
(p=0.082) 
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Modified Ashworth Scale [0-4] 1.6±0.8 -  
Motricity Index [0-100] 
   Hemiparetic arm 
   Non-hemiparetic arm 
 
54.3±14.9 
100 
 
- 
 
Nottingham Sensory Assessment  
   Tactile sensation [0-2] 
   Kinesthesia [0-3] 
   Stereognosis [0-2] 
 
1.2±0.8 
0.9±0.9 
0.5±0.8 
 
- 
 
 
 
Mini-Mental State Examination [0-30] 27.2±2.2 -  
Mississippi Aphasia Screening Test [0-
50] 
49.0±1.6 -  
Results of age, chronicity and clinical scales are expressed in terms of mean and 
standard deviation. Scores in the Modified Ashworth Scale of 1+ were converted into 
1.5 points. Comparisons between groups were performed with independent sample t-
tests (age) and Chi-squared (sex and non-dominant/hemiparetic side). TACI: Total 
Anterior Circulation Infarct; PACI: Partial Anterior Circulation Infarct. 
The experimental protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of NISA 
Hospitals. All of the participants provided written informed consent prior to enrollment 
in the study. 
Materials 
The experiment was performed in a quiet room free of distractors where a conventional 
table (120x60x75 cm) with a movable wooden vertical board (50x40x4 cm) was 
arranged. Instrumentation included a man’s and a woman’s right and left rubber hand 
with forearm, two equal small brushes with a head diameter of 0.5 cm, and a hammer. 
In addition, a black oversized tee was used to cover participants’ both arms down to just 
above the forearms. A hole was made to introduce the arm of the rubber hand during the 
experiment.  
Sensorization included a wearable wireless bracelet that measured the GSR and 
skin temperature (Affectiva®, Waltham, MA, USA), two extra sensors that also 
estimated the GSR (Twente Medical Systems International B.V., Oldenzaal, 
Netherlands), and two Ag-AgCl sensors to estimate the surface electromyographic 
activity (sEMG) (Twente Medical Systems International B.V., Oldenzaal, Netherlands). 
A fake bracelet was handcrafted and fixed to the rubber hand to simulate the real one.  
Procedure 
Two experimenters conducted all of the sessions. Participants were blind to the purpose 
of the experiment. Initially, a brief description of the experiment, stimuli, and 
equipment was provided by Experimenter A. Experimenter B, who was equipped with 
the sensors between participants, helped participants to wear the oversized tee and 
equipped them with the sensors. The two GSR sensors were attached to the medial 
phalange of the index finger and the middle finger of the unstimulated arm, as in 
previous studies (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Ma & Hommel, 2013). The wearable bracelet, 
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which leaves the fingers free to be stimulated was fixed to the stimulated arm to also 
determine the responses in this side. The electromyographical sensors were fixed on the 
palmar (anterior) side of the forearm, one in the middle point of the distal third and the 
other between the middle and the proximal third of the arm under study. Sensors aimed 
to record the electrical activity mainly produced by the flexor muscles of the wrist and 
the fingers (palmaris longus, flexor carpis radialis, flexor digitorum superficialis, and 
pronator teres). Participants were required to sit in one side of the table in a comfortable 
position with both arms resting on the table and palms facing downward. Experimenter 
A sat in front of the participants and ask them to relax and maintain the position for 10 
minutes for temperature acclimation and skin conductance stabilization. After that, the 
experimenter placed the vertical board in front of their right or left shoulder to hide the 
arm under study from sight (Figure 1). The rubber hand was placed in the other side of 
the frame at 15 cm to the participant’s real hand (measured between index fingers) 
(Aimola Davies & White, 2013; Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 
2009) and at 5.5 cm of the wooden frame, in an anatomically congruent position. The 
proximal end of the forearm of the rubber hand was covered with the tee to prevent the 
participants from seeing that it was not connected to their body, which might have 
reduced the vividness of the illusion (Ocklenburg et al., 2011).  
Participants were asked to “pay attention to the rubber hand”, and the 
experiment began. The participants’ hand and forearm, and the rubber hand and forearm 
were synchronously brushed on the dorsal surface with the paintbrushes. Stimulation 
was administered in the hemiparetic side in participants with stroke and in the non-
dominant side in healthy individuals to match the reduced dexterity that individuals 
with stroke presented in the arm under study. Brush strokes were made at approximately 
1 Hz in a proximal to distal direction with an unpredictable starting point (Kammers et 
al., 2011; Longo et al., 2008; Rohde et al., 2013). The length of the strokes was 
variable, ranging from 2 cm to 10 cm, approximately. Stroking was applied for 120 
seconds. After that, Experimenter B smashed the back of the rubber hand with the 
hummer and the experiment concluded. The experiment was conducted only once per 
participant. During the study, Experimenter B was in charge of the collection of the 
neurophysiological data.  
 
Figure 1. Experimental setting 
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The picture describes the experimental setting of the experiment and the acquisition of 
the neurophysiological data. GSR: Galvanic skin response. ST: skin temperature. EMG: 
electromyography. 
Outcome measures 
After the experiment, participants were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement 
with ten statements about embodiment of the rubber hand. The questionnaire evaluated 
the extent that the rubber hand belonged to the participant, the participant had control 
over the rubber hand, the rubber hand and real hand were in the same location, and the 
rubber hand had taken on features of the actual hand (Longo et al., 2008) (Table 2). 
Participants rated the statements in a 7-item Likert scale, where a response of +3 
indicated strongly agreement and −3 indicated strong disagreement. Before completing 
the questionnaire, the items were explained to the participants by a speech and language 
therapist. 
Neurophysiological examination included variation in the GSR of both arms, 
and variation in the skin temperature and sEMG of the unstimulated arm.  
Table 2. Questionnaire about embodiment 
Statements 
It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than at a rubber hand 
It seemed like the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand 
It seemed like the rubber hand belonged to me 
It seemed like the rubber hand was my hand 
It seemed like the rubber hand was part of my body 
It seemed like my hand was in the location where the rubber hand was 
It seemed like the rubber hand was in the location where my hand was 
It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand 
It seemed like I could have moved the rubber hand if I had wanted 
It seemed like I was in control of the rubber hand 
Statements of the questionnaire about embodiment 
Data analysis 
The variation in the GSR was estimated as the difference between the maximum peak 
that occurred between 1 and 5 s after the hammer smash, and the mean value in the 
second previous to the smash, as described in previous works (Armel & Ramachandran, 
2003; Ma & Hommel, 2013; Reinersmann et al., 2013). Only those variations greater 
than 0.03 mS were considered meaningful (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; 
Reinersmann et al., 2013). The variation in the skin temperature was estimated as the 
difference between the mean temperature in the following 5 s after the hammer smash 
and in the 5 s previous to the stimulation, similarly to previous works (Rohde et al., 
2013). Variation in the surface muscular activity was estimated as the difference 
between the averaged root mean square values of the sEMG signal in the 5 s previous to 
the stimulation and in the 5 s previous to the hammer smash. The signal was filtered 
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using a band-pass filter (20–500 Hz, 48 dB/octave) and a notch filter (50 Hz, 48 
dB/octave) (Huis In 't Veld, van Boxtel, & de Gelder, 2014) and rectified for analysis 
(Clancy, Morin, & Merletti, 2002). Artifacts in the signal caused by overt movement 
during these intervals were rejected. The neurophysiological data were processed offline 
using Matlab R2013b (MathWorks®, Natick, MA, USA). 
 Subcomponents of embodiment were defined according to the original 
description of the questionnaire as the average score of the first five statements (body-
ownership), of the sixth to eighth statements (localization), and of the last two 
statements (agency) (Longo et al., 2008). Average scores greater than 0 were considered 
positive. 
Given the number of observations of each outcome measure, their normality was 
checked using Shapiro-Wilk tests. Comparisons between the control and the 
experimental group in the scores of the questionnaire and in the neurophysiological data 
were performed with independent sample Mann-Whitney U tests. One-way analyses of 
covariance were performed to estimate the interaction between the demographical and 
clinical variables with the subjective and neurophysiological responses. Chi-square tests 
were performed to compare the percentage of participants from the two groups who 
experienced body-ownership. Spearman correlation analyses were performed between 
embodiment and neurophysiological measures. The α level was set at 0.05 for all 
analyses (two-sided). All analyses were computed with SPSS Statistics, version 22 
(IBM®, New York, U.S.). 
Results 
Embodiment  
Scores in the embodiment questionnaire showed that individuals with stroke felt a 
significantly stronger sense of body-ownership (p=0.009) and agency (p=0.046) than 
heathy individuals, while no significant differences were found in localization 
(p=0.656) (Table 3) (Figure 2). These results expressed in terms of number of 
participants who felt the effects also evidenced the differences between groups. While 
only 13 healthy participants (61.9%) felt the sense of body-ownership, all of the 
participants with stroke but one (95%) reported to have felt this effect (p=0.010). 
Similarly, only nine healthy participants (42.9%) felt agency over the rubber hand in 
contrast to 16 participants with stroke (80%) (p=0.015). No demographical or clinical 
variable covaried with the reports of the participants with stroke in any embodiment 
component. In addition, participants with stroke who did not felt body-ownership or 
agency (Figure 2) also did not show differences neither in demographical nor clinical 
scales.  
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Table 3. Results in the embodiment questionnaire 
 Healthy group 
(n=21) 
Stroke group 
(n=20) 
Significance 
Body-ownership 0.9±1.9 2.3±1.2 p=0.004 
Localization 1.1±1.9 0.9±0.9 NS (p=0.266) 
Agency 0.2±2.0 1.6±2.2 p=0.009 
Results are expressed in terms of mean and standard deviation. Scores range from -3 to 
+3.  
 
Figure 2. Significant differences between groups in embodiment 
 
The picture shows a box and whisker plot of body-ownership and agency. *: p<0.05; 
**: p<0.001. 
Electromyography 
Results evidenced significant differences between healthy subjects and participants with 
stroke (p=0.005) (Table 4) (Figure 3). While the experiment caused an increase in the 
muscular activity of healthy subjects, participants with stroke experienced the opposite 
tendency, showing a decrease in the registered electromyographical data. Significant but 
smaller differences were also obtained when taking into account only those subjects 
who felt the sense of body-ownership (healthy participants experienced a variation of 
0.91±3.07 mV, and participants with stroke of -0.74±1.05 mV).  
Galvanic skin response 
All of the participants but one healthy subject increased their GSR in both hands during 
the experiment (Table 4) (Figure 3). Recordings in the unstimulated hand showed 
similar response in healthy subjects and individuals with stroke. However, recordings in 
the stimulated hand showed significantly different responses (p=0.001). In terms of 
number of participants, all of the 13 healthy subjects who felt body-ownership 
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experienced a meaningful increase on the GSR in the unstimulated hand, and 11 
(84.6%) in the stimulated hand. Similarly, all of the participants with stroke but one 
(94.7%) experienced this increase in the unstimulated hand. However, this effect was 
detected in the stimulated hand only for four participants (21.1%). Very similar results 
were detected when only those subjects who felt body-ownership were considered. 
Skin temperature 
All of the participants but three individuals with stroke experienced an increase in the 
average temperature, which was significantly higher in healthy subjects (Table 4) 
(Figure 3). When considering only those participants who experienced the sense of 
body-ownership, the rise was slightly higher in healthy subjects (from 0.70 ºC to 0.82 
ºC), while remained almost unaltered in participants with stroke (from 0.45 ºC to 0.47 
ºC).  
Table 4. Neurophysiological data 
 Healthy group 
(n=21) 
Stroke group 
(n=20) 
Significance 
Galvanic skin response (mS) 
    Dominant/non-hemiparetic 
    Non-dominant/hemiparetic 
 
1.13±0.90 
0.49±0.41 
 
1.14±1.38 
0.11±0.25 
 
NS (p=0.375) 
p=0.001 
Skin temperature change (ºC) 0.70±0.29 0.45±0.41 p=0.030 
Electromyography (mV) 1.36±3.09 -0.81±1.08 p=0.003 
Results are expressed in terms of mean and standard deviation.  
 
Figure 3. Significant differences between groups in neurophysiological responses 
 
The picture shows a box and whisker plot of galvanic skin response, the skin 
temperature, and the surface electromyography. *: p<0.05; **: p<0.001. 
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Interaction between embodiment and neurophysiological data 
Weak but statistically significant correlations were found between body-ownership and 
the GSR in the stimulated hand and the sEMG, and between localization and the GSR in 
the unstimulated hand (Table 5). A tendency towards signification was also detected 
between body-ownership and the GSR in the unstimulated hand, and between the 
agency in the stimulated hand. No other significant interactions were found. 
Table 5. Interaction between embodiment and neurophysiological data 
 Body-ownership Localization Agency 
Galvanic skin response    
    Dominant/non-hemiparetic r=0.307,  
NS (p=0.051) 
r=0.426,  
p=0.005 
r=0.119,  
NS (p=0.460) 
    Non-dominant/hemiparetic r=-0.334, 
p=0.033 
r=0.100,  
NS (p=0.535) 
r=-0.301,  
NS (p=0.056) 
Skin temperature change r=0.102,  
NS (p=0.527) 
r=0.158,  
NS (p=0.323) 
r=0.244,  
NS (p=0.124) 
Electromyography r=-0.314,  
p=0.046 
r=0.027,  
NS (p=0.865) 
r=-0.227,  
NS (p=0.154) 
NS: non-significant 
Discussion 
In this study, the subjective and neurophysiological responses of healthy individuals and 
hemiparetic individuals with stroke after the RHI were collected and compared. This is 
the first attempt to simultaneously assess different embodiment subcomponents (body-
ownership, localization, and agency) and different neurophysiological measures (GSR, 
skin temperature, and sEMG) and the interaction between them in clinically controlled 
individuals with stroke. Our results showed that, compared to healthy participants, 
individuals with stroke experienced stronger body-ownership and agency and exhibited 
smaller increase of the GSR and the skin temperature, and reduced sEMG activity in the 
stimulated hand. Possible plasticity of the body schema of participants with stroke and a 
pathological increased predominance of the visual input over proprioception could have 
promoted the results in the embodiment subcomponents. A possible sudomotor 
dysregulation and the previously evidenced role of the premotor cortex in this process 
could explain the different neurophysiological responses, which did not evidence a clear 
relationship between them besides a weak relationship between body-ownership and 
GSR and sEMG, and between localization and GSR.   
Differences between groups 
Embodiment 
The reported sense of body-ownership elicited by the experiment in healthy participants 
is supported by previous research. Earlier studies using similar versions of the 
questionnaire used in our study showed reports of body-ownership that ranged from 
53% (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2009) to 78% (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014) during analogous 
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visuotactile synchronous conditions. The significant stronger effect detected for 
participants with stroke contradicts a controlled study involving healthy participants 
(Zeller et al., 2011). However, differences in the sample (no reports on motor 
impairment), the procedure, and the measuring tools could explain this difference. In 
contrast, our results are in line with more recent reports. A study involving hemiplegic 
individuals post-stroke showed that stimulation of the affected hand elicited stronger 
illusion than stimulation of the less affected hand, which was attributed to a disruption 
of the normal integration between afferent and efferent signals (Burin et al., 2015). A 
previous exploratory study with a subject with hand disownership after stroke had also 
shown the same results (van Stralen et al., 2013). Interestingly, in the latter study visual 
exposure to the rubber hand was reported to be sufficient to elicit strong feelings of 
ownership, which highlights the role of the visual input in the experiment. In fact, visual 
inspection of a body part has been shown to enhance the detection of somatosensory 
stimuli, regardless of proprioceptive orienting (Tipper et al., 1998). In another study 
involving a participant post-stroke with unilateral spatial neglect, the experiment was 
reported to temporarily improve participant’s performance in neglect tests (Kitadono & 
Humphreys, 2007), which was attributed to a possible shift in the participant’s sense of 
midline. Even though there is very limited research about how stroke can affect 
embodiment or the body schema, clinical reports of post-stroke individuals suffering 
from disorders of body representation and illusory own body perceptions could 
highlight the effects of this pathology in these mechanisms. We hypothesize that the 
high reports of body-ownership in participants with stroke could have been facilitated 
by a body schema plasticity promoted by the brain lesion and its resulting motor 
limitations (Frederiks, 1969). This condition could have allowed the external limb to be 
incorporated (thus promoting a reconfiguration of the body schema) more easily. 
Although the neural signatures of this mechanism still remain unknown, recent studies 
have evidenced the role of the premotor cortex of both hemispheres in embodiment of 
body parts (Arzy et al., 2006; Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2014; Gentile et al., 2015; 
Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2015; Petkova et al., 2011), also after stroke (Zeller et al., 
2011). Interestingly, similar sensorimotor mechanisms have been shown to be recruited 
during the RHI and motor imagery (Ionta, Sforza, Funato, & Blanke, 2013), and to elicit 
overlapped brain networks (Evans & Blanke, 2013), including the premotor cortex 
(Gerardin et al., 2000; Ionta, Ferretti, Merla, Tartaro, & Romani, 2010). The similarity 
of these networks with those active during motor execution (Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & 
Passingham, 2003; Jeannerod, 2001) could explain that a breakdown of the network 
could have consequences to motor function, which in turn can affect the body-schema, 
and embodiment. In our study, cerebral infarctions in participants with ischemic stroke, 
all of them anterior, could have predominantly damaged this brain network, which 
could have promoted plastic alterations in their body schema.  
Our results also suggest that body-ownership could be an attention-driven 
mechanism that evidences a predominance of the visual input over the proprioception in 
this effect. This could explain the fact that even though some participants had 
diminished tactile sensation, according to the results in the Nottingham Sensory 
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Assessment, their reports about the effects of the experiment were as vivid as in other 
participants. This could also explain how body-ownership has been elicited in absence 
of tactile stimulation (van Stralen et al., 2013) and how viewing the body in a mirror 
can improve body-ownership in somatoparaphrenia (Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & 
Fotopoulou, 2013). The visual influence on cortical motor areas has been shown to 
occur even with misalignment of the visual feedback (Touzalin-Chretien, Ehrler, & 
Dufour, 2010), despite this incongruence disrupts motor execution (Wasaka & Kakigi, 
2012). Interestingly, the effectiveness of visual enhancement of touch depends on 
subjects’ tactile acuity, improving tactile performance in subjects with lower tactile 
sensitivity (Serino, Farnè, Rinaldesi, Haggard, & Làdavas, 2007), which could also 
evidence the visual dominance over proprioception in individuals with stroke. These 
hypotheses are consistent with previous results in neglect. Reconfiguration of the body 
schema through cueing attention could have shifted the egocentric representation of 
space to the left, consequently reducing neglect (Kitadono & Humphreys, 2007). 
 Even though the RHI experiment isolates body-ownership in the absence of 
movement and efferent information, participants with stroke also reported to have felt 
agency over the rubber hand to a greater extent than healthy participants. Unfortunately, 
there are no previous reports on agency in stroke survivors. However, in a similar way 
to body-ownership, we hypothesize that the brain injury, together with its derived motor 
impairments could explain these results. Neuroimaging studies would be necessary to 
confirm the lesions of the premotor cortex and the involvement of this area in our 
sample, but if so, it could support the hypothesis that the premotor cortex not only 
encodes the body pose but also some control of proximal movements (Graziano & 
Cooke, 2006; Graziano, Taylor, & Moore, 2002). In spite of the fact that body-
ownership and agency have been postulated as qualitatively different experiences 
(Tsakiris et al., 2010), this relationship, still on debate (Ma & Hommel, 2015), could be 
more tangled in concomitant alterations to the body schema. 
Electromyography 
The premotor cortex, which has been evidenced as one of the brain areas involved in 
RHI, is also thought to be involved in the planning and execution of movements. It 
projects in to primary motor cortex and to the spinal cord, and receives somatosensory 
and visual input. Furthermore, it has been shown that the premotor cortex plays a role in 
orienting the body and readying the postural muscles for forthcoming movements 
(Rosenbaum, 2010). In addition, the ventral premotor cortex of macaques, lately named 
as polysensory zone (Graziano & Cooke, 2006), has been suggested to contain a 
somatotopic representation of the arms, hands, face, and mouth, which even responds 
when a visual stimulus is placed in the region of space near the tactile receptive field 
(Gentilucci et al., 1988). This may imply that the premotor cortex could encode a 
representation of not only some body parts but also of the peripersonal space, which 
could be useful to anchor the world in relation to the body and enable rapid responses to 
threats and for hunting (Graziano et al., 2002). We speculate that the sense of body-
ownership elicited by the experiment could have promoted a reconfiguration of the body 
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schema, and consequently of the peripersonal space. The involvement of the premotor 
cortex in this mechanism, evidenced by previous studies, could also have had an 
unknown inhibitory effect that decreased muscle activity in individuals with stroke, who 
could present abnormally increased muscle activity, while having a null effect on heathy 
participants. Interestingly, lesions of premotor cortex have been reported to cause 
hypertonicity (Mukherjee & Chakravarty, 2010).  
Further neuroimaging studies involving participants with stroke should confirm 
the link between the damaged areas and the muscle tone. If true, even though the effects 
detected in our study could be temporary or clinically irrelevant, these findings could 
provide more insights about disorders affecting the upper motor neurons, such as spastic 
dystonia. It manifests as muscle overactivity at rest without a primary triggering factor, 
which causes abnormal position of some body parts (Denny-Brown, 1966) and poses a 
major cause of disability with only palliative treatments (symptoms are usually 
alleviated with drugs as baclofen, diazepam, or tizandine) with strong side effects. 
Although the clinical implication of these findings should be explored in future studies, 
since the underlying mechanisms of RHI have been recently linked to those from 
mirror-therapy and motor imagery (Moseley, Gallace, & Spence, 2008), and dynamic 
changes in perceived ownership by the RHI have been suggested to be trait-like 
(Bekrater-Bodmann, Foell, Diers, & Flor, 2012), if these hypotheses are correct, the 
effects of the RHI could be used to predict the effectiveness of these treatments in 
stroke individuals. 
Galvanic skin response 
The increase in the GSR in the unstimulated hand during the experiment is supported by 
previous findings in the unstimulated hand across different populations. Similar results 
have been reported in healthy subjects (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ma & Hommel, 
2013), in upper limb amputees (Ehrsson et al., 2008), and in subjects with complex 
regional pain syndrome (Reinersmann et al., 2013). However, there is no previous 
research on the effects of the experiment on the stimulated hand. This lack of evidence 
is possibly motivated by limitations in the instrumentation used to measure the GSR. 
Common devices, as the one used in this study to explore the unstimulated hand, 
usually have two sensors that are attached to the fingers, thus impeding their stroking. 
In our study, the use of a bracelet allowed us to simultaneously measure the response in 
the stimulated hand, evidencing a less relevant increase of the GSR in this side during 
the experiment, significantly smaller in participants with stroke than in the healthy 
group. Nonetheless, even though this effect could be ascribed to the effects of the 
experiment, it could have also been motivated by a sudomotor dysregulation derived 
from the brain injury, which has been reported after cerebrovascular diseases, 
particularly after ischemic stroke in acute and chronic stages (Korpelainen, Sotaniemi, 
& Myllyla, 1999; Meyer, Strittmatter, Fischer, Georg, & Schmitz, 2004; 
Muslumanoglu, Akyuz, Aki, Karsidag, & Us, 2002). Stroke has been reported to 
suppress the reflex activity of the sympathetic nervous system (Korpelainen, Tolonen, 
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Sotaniemi, & Myllyla, 1993), which can cause asymmetric responses after a focal brain 
lesion (Linden & Berlit, 1995).  
Regardless of the cause, the increase in both hands exceeded the proposed 
threshold of relevance (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003), thus supporting the fact that the 
RHI elicits neurocognitive mechanisms that trigger the GSR of both hands in both 
healthy subjects and individuals with stroke. Again, we speculate that the involvement 
of the premotor cortex in the RHI could have elicited electrodermal activity that caused 
variations in the GSR. The close connection between the pyramidal (corticospinal) 
fibers for the transmission of skeletal muscle impulse and sudomotor (corticopontine) 
fibers could explain this effect. Interestingly, it has been posed that the combined 
striatal and premotor cortical origins of electrodermal activity can be viewed together as 
a single premotor electrodermal component and a concomitant of nonpyramidal motor 
system activity (Boucsein, 2012). Whether the increase of the GSR is caused by a 
reconfiguration of the body schema (and the consequent involvement of the premotor 
cortex) or by a threat to a human-like arm is still controversial (Ma & Hommel, 2013).  
Skin temperature 
Different measures of skin temperature variation, generally measured with infrared 
thermometers, have been used as neurophysiological correlates of the RHI. As opposed 
to the increase in the skin temperature revealed in our study, it was initially postulated 
that the illusion evokes a limb-specific decrease that correlates with the strength of the 
illusion (Moseley, Olthof, et al., 2008). Furthermore, the relationship between 
temperature and body-ownership has been suggested to be causal: cooling down the 
participant's hand has been reported to increase the strength of the experiment and vice 
versa (Kammers et al., 2011). However, changes in temperature between synchronous 
and asynchronous stimulation through finger touches have shown limitations in 
discriminating between experimental variations of the experiment (Hohwy & Paton, 
2010). In addition, a study involving individuals with schizophrenia showed less 
compelling results. Only when the right hand was stimulated, a significant heating of 
the unstimulated hand and cooling of the stimulated hand were detected (Thakkar et al., 
2011). Another study found no evidence for hand cooling in two experiments involving 
healthy subjects using a robot-based stroking procedure and only a non-significant 
difference between hands during manual stroking (Rohde et al., 2013). These results 
were similar in a series of experiments evaluating the stroking velocity, side of the 
stimulation, and the material, concluding that skin temperature could be a less robust 
outcome measure of the RHI (van Stralen et al., 2014).  
As for sEMG and GSR, we conjecture that the involvement of the premotor 
cortex in the RHI could have promoted the variations in the skin temperature. Electrical 
stimulation (and even removal) of premotor cortical areas has shown excitatory as well 
as inhibitory sudorisecretory influences (Boucsein, 2012), which could explain the 
different results reported by preliminary studies (Moseley, Olthof, et al., 2008; Rohde et 
al., 2013). In addition, temperature regulation might also result from changes in arousal 
and attentional drive (Thakkar et al., 2011), which could be key factors to promote 
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body-ownership. We hypothesized that these factors can cause conflicting effects which 
can mask each other. These effects, together with possible non-stabilized temperature 
conditions in previous studies, could have led to misleading interpretation of the results, 
and should be carefully addressed in further studies.  
Interaction between embodiment and neurophysiological data 
Although the neurophysiological measures showed different responses in healthy and 
post-stroke subjects, these measures failed to show convergent validity with nearly all 
of the subjective evaluations of embodiment. Although the only significant correlations, 
which were found in the body-ownership and the localization, were weak, they might 
evidence some effects worth to discuss. First, the correlation found between body-
ownership and the GSR in the stimulated (statistically significant) and unstimulated 
hand (almost statistically significant) could evidence a relationship between body-
ownership and the sudomotor activity, in line with previous reports (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003). Interestingly, our results appeared to show that this interaction is 
inverse in both arms: greater body-ownership is associated to a decrease in GSR in the 
stimulated hand and an increase in the unstimulated hand. Second, sEMG seemed to be 
associated to body-ownership, in such a way that greater embodiment was linked to 
greater decrease or relaxation of the muscular activity. Finally, the greatest but still 
weak correlation, which was detected between localization and the GSR in the 
unstimulated hand, could indicate that the body schema reorientation reflected by the 
localization might influence sudomotor activity, as has been previously posed for body-
ownership (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; D'Alonzo & Cipriani, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 
2008; Ma & Hommel, 2013). Unfortunately, since this is the first study to investigate 
multiple embodiment constructs and neurophysiological variables, comparison with 
other reports was not possible. Future studies should confirm these effects (and, if so, 
clarify whether the muscular relaxation and the sudomotor activity are cause or 
consequence of the elicited body-ownership and localization, respectively) or attribute 
them to the multiple analysis performed, rather than evidencing a linear relationship 
between the neurophysiological measures and the embodiment mechanisms.  
In any event, our results and all of the contradicting reports of the previous 
studies that individually explored neurophysiological correlates of the RHI suggest that 
it would be misleading to assume a one-to-one relationship between the subjective 
perceptions of embodiment and the physiological responses elicited during the RHI. 
Although, as mentioned, there are no previous attempts to study this interaction, we 
argue that this relationship could be far too complex to be captured by a linear 
correlation and, moreover, it could be affected by different factors that may vary across 
and within studies. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study must be carefully considered when analyzing the results. 
First, the sample size (41 participants) can be considered small, though it is similar to or 
larger than those typically involved in state-of-the-art interventions (Lloyd et al., 2013; 
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Salomon et al., 2013). Second, all of the participants were attending a 
neurorehabilitation program, which could affect in an unknown fashion to the results in 
the experiment. Third, no records of the proprioceptive drift were available. The 
residual motor impairment even in the less affected (unstimulated) arm of participants 
with stroke prevented this measure to be registered reliably. Fourth, no records of the 
skin temperature in the unstimulated hand are available, which does not allow the 
comparison between temperature variations in both hands. Fifth, in a similar manner, 
the different devices used for registering the GSR prevented the study of limb-specific 
responses. Finally, no magnetic resonance imaging-based volumetric measurements of 
the premotor area are available, which prevented volumes to be correlated with 
neurophysiological, neuropathological, and neuropsychological findings of our study. 
However, the homogeneity of the sample in demographic and clinical variables (only 
individuals without neglect and asomatognosia were included), the assessment of the 
motor, sensory, and cognitive condition of participants with stroke, the examination of 
different sub-components of embodiment, and the concurrent exploration of different 
neurophysiological variables and their interactions, support the results of our study. 
Conclusions 
In this study, the subjective and neurophysiological responses of healthy individuals and 
hemiparetic individuals with stroke after the RHI were collected and compared. The 
experiment elicited stronger body-ownership and agency in hemiparetic individuals 
with stroke than in healthy individuals. Possible body schema plasticity and a 
pathological increased predominance of the visual input over proprioception could have 
promoted the results. Both groups showed different neurophysiological responses to the 
experiment. Individuals with stroke exhibited smaller increase of the GSR and the skin 
temperature, and reduced sEMG activity in the stimulated hand. A possible suppression 
of the reflex activity of the sympathetic nervous system caused by the brain injury and 
the involvement of the premotor cortex in the reconfiguration of the body schema 
promoted by the mechanisms of body-ownership could have motivated the main 
differences in the neurophysiological responses. Analyses of the interactions between 
subjective and neurophysiological responses were inconclusive, while they could point 
to a weak relationship between body-ownership and sEMG and GSR, and between 
localization and GSR. These results could evidence a body schema plasticity promoted 
by brain lesions and support the role of the premotor cortex in this mechanism. 
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